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Abstract
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim
of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought
procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence properties (e.g. anonymity, unlinkability,
vote secrecy) for a bounded number of sessions. However, these procedures are based on a naive
symbolic exploration of all traces of the considered processes which, unsurprisingly, greatly limits
the scalability and practical impact of the verification tools.
In this paper, we overcome this difficulty by developing partial order reduction techniques
for the verification of security protocols. We provide reduced transition systems that optimally
eliminate redundant traces, and which are adequate for model-checking trace equivalence prop-
erties of protocols by means of symbolic execution. We have implemented our reductions in the
tool Apte, and demonstrated that it achieves the expected speedup on various protocols.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are concurrent processes that use various cryptographic primitives in
order to achieve security properties such as secrecy, authentication, anonymity, unlinkability,
etc. They involve a high level of concurrency and are difficult to analyse by hand. Actually,
many protocols have been shown to be flawed several years after their publication (and
deployment). This has lead to a flurry of research on formal verification of protocols.
A successful way of representing protocols is to use variants of the pi-calculus, whose
labelled transition systems naturally express how a protocol may interact with a (potentially
malicious) environment whose knowledge increases as more messages are exchanged over
the network. Some security properties (e.g., secrecy, authentication) are then described as
reachability properties, while others (e.g., unlinkability, anonymity) are expressed as trace
equivalence properties. In order to decide such properties, a reasonable assumption is to
bound the number of protocol sessions, thereby limiting the length of execution traces. Even
under this assumption, infinitely many traces remain, since each input may be fed infinitely
many different messages. However, symbolic execution and dedicated constraint solving
procedures have been devised to provide decision procedures for reachability [27, 15] and,
more recently, equivalence properties [36, 11]. Unfortunately, the resulting tools, especially
those for checking equivalence (e.g., Apte [10], Spec [35]), have a very limited practical impact
because they scale very badly. This is not surprising since they treat concurrency in a very
naive way, exploring all possible symbolic interleavings of concurrent actions.
Contributions. We develop partial order reduction (POR) techniques [31, 7, 24] for trace
equivalence checking of security protocols. Our main challenge is to do it in a way that is
compatible with symbolic execution: we should provide a reduction that is effective when
messages remain unknown, but leverages information about messages when it is inferred
by the constraint solver. We achieve this by refining interleaving semantics in two steps,
gradually eliminating redundant traces. The first refinement, called compression, uses the
notion of polarity [3] to impose a simple strategy on traces. It does not rely on data
analysis at all and can easily be used as a replacement for the usual semantics in verification
algorithms. The second one, called reduction, takes data into account and achieves optimality
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
04
76
8v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 Se
p 2
01
5
in eliminating redundant traces. In practice, the reduction step can be implemented in an
approximated fashion, through an extension of constraint resolution procedures. We have
done so in the tool Apte, showing that our theoretical results do translate to significant
practical optimisations.
Outline. We consider in Section 2 a rich process algebra for representing security protocols.
It supports arbitrary cryptographic primitives, and even includes a replication operator
suitable for modelling unbounded numbers of sessions. Thus, we do not restrict to a particular
fragment for which a decision procedure exists, but show the full scope of our theoretical
results. We give in Section 3 an annotated semantics that will facilitate the next technical
developments. We then define our compressed semantics in Section 4 and the reduced
semantics in Section 5. In both sections, we first restrict the transition system, then show
that the restriction is adequate for checking trace equivalence under some action-determinism
condition. We finally discuss how these results can be lifted to the symbolic setting in
Section 6. Specifically, we describe how we have implemented our techniques in Apte, and we
present experimental results showing that the optimisations are fully effective in practice.
We discuss related work in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8. Complete proofs are given
in appendices.
2 Model for security protocols
In this section we introduce our process algebra, which is a variant of the applied pi-calculus [1]
that has been designed with the aim of modelling cryptographic protocols. Processes can
exchange complex messages, represented by terms quotiented by some equational theory.
One of the key difficulties in the applied pi-calculus is to model the knowledge of the
environment, seen as an attacker who listens to network communication and may also inject
messages. One has to make a distinction between the content of a message (sent by the
environment) and the way the message has been created (from knowledge available to the
environment). While the distinction between messages and recipes came from security
applications, it is naturally of much broader interest, as it gives a precise, intentional content
to labelled transitions that we exploit to analyse data dependencies.
We study a process algebra that may seem quite restrictive: we forbid internal commu-
nication and private channels. This is however reasonable when studying security protocols
faced with the usual omnipotent attacker. In such a setting, we end up considering the
worst-case scenario where any communication has to be made via the environment.
2.1 Syntax
We assume a number of disjoint and infinite sets: a set C of channels, whose elements are
denoted by a, b, c; a set N of private names or nonces, denoted by n or k; a set X of variables,
denoted by x, y, z as usual; and a set W of handles, denoted by w and used for referring to
previously output terms. Next, we consider a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function
symbols together with their arity. Terms over S, written T (S), are inductively generated
from S and function symbols from Σ. When S ⊆ N , elements of T (S) are called messages.
When S ⊆ W, they are called recipes and written M , N . Intuitively, recipes express how a
message has been derived by the environment from the messages obtained so far. Finally, we
consider an equational theory E over terms to assign a meaning to function symbols in Σ.
I Example 1. Let Σ = {enc/2, dec/2, h/1} and E be the equational theory induced by the
equation dec(enc(x, y), y) = x. Intuitively, the symbols enc and dec represent symmetric
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encryption and decryption, whereas h is used to model a hash function. Now, assume that
the environment knows the key k as well as the ciphertext enc(n, k), and that these two
messages are referred to by handles w and w′. The environment may decrypt the ciphertext
with the key k, apply the hash function, and encrypt the result using k to get the message
m0 = enc(h(n), k). This computation is modelled using the recipe M0 = enc(h(dec(w′, w)), w).
I Definition 2. Processes are defined by the following syntax where c, a ∈ C, x ∈ X ,
u, v ∈ T (N ∪ X ), and #»c (resp. #»n) is a sequence of channels from C (resp. names from N ).
P,Q ::= 0 | (P | Q) | in(c, x).P | out(c, u).P | if u = v then P else Q | !a#»c , #»nP
The last construct combines replication with channel and name restriction: !a#»c , #»nP may be
read as !(ν #»c .out(a, #»c ).ν #»n.P ) in standard applied pi-calculus. Our goal with this compound
construct is to support replication in a way that is not fundamentally incompatible with the
action-determinism condition which we eventually impose on our processes. This is achieved
here by advertising on the public channel a any new copy of the replicated process. At the
same time, we make public the new channels #»c on which the copy may operate — but not
the new names #»n . While it may seem restrictive, this style is actually natural for security
protocols where the attacker knows exactly to whom he is sending a message and from whom
he is receiving, e.g., via IP addresses.
We shall only consider ground processes, where each variable is bound by an input. We
denote by fc(P ) and bc(P ) the set of free and bound channels of P .
I Example 3. The process P0 models an agent who sends the ciphertext enc(n, k), and then
waits for an input on c. In case the input has the expected form, the constant ok is emitted.
P0 = out(c, enc(n, k)).in(c, x).if dec(x, k) = h(n) then out(c, ok).0 else 0
The processes P0 as well as !ac,nP0 are ground. We have that fc(P0) = {c} and bc(P0) = ∅
whereas fc(!ac,nP0) = {a} and bc(!ac,nP0) = {c}.
2.2 Semantics
We only consider processes that are normal w.r.t. internal reduction  defined as follows:
if u = v then P else Q P when u =E v P | Q  P ′ | Q
if u = v then P else Q Q when u 6=E v Q | P  Q | P ′
}
when P P ′
(P1 | P2) | P3  P1 | (P2 | P3) P | 0 P 0 | P  P
Any process in normal form built from parallel composition can be uniquely written as
P1 | (P2 | (. . . | Pn)) with n ≥ 2, which we note Πni=1Pi, where each process Pi is neither a
parallel composition nor the process 0.
We now define our labelled transition system. It deals with configurations (denoted
by A, B) which are pairs (P; Φ) where P is a multiset of ground processes and Φ, called
the frame, is a substitution mapping handles to messages that have been made available to
the environment. Given a configuration A, Φ(A) denotes its second component. Given a
frame Φ, dom(Φ) denotes its domain.
In ({in(c, x).Q} unionmulti P; Φ) in(c,M)−−−−−→ ({Q{MΦ/x}} unionmulti P; Φ) M ∈ T (dom(Φ))
Out ({out(c, u).Q} unionmulti P; Φ) out(c, w)−−−−−→ ({Q} unionmulti P; Φ ∪ {w 7→ u}) w ∈ W fresh
Repl ({!a#»c , #»nP} unionmulti P; Φ) sess(a,
#»c )−−−−−−→ ({P ; !a#»c , #»nP} unionmulti P; Φ) #»c , #»n fresh
Par ({Πni=1Pi} unionmulti P; Φ) τ−→ ({P1, . . . , Pn} unionmulti P; Φ)
Zero ({0} unionmulti P; Φ) τ−→ (P; Φ)
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Rule In expresses that an input process may receive any message that the environment
can derive from the current frame. In rule Out, the frame is enriched with a new message.
The last two rules simply translate the parallel structure of processes into the multiset
structure of the configuration. As explained above, rule Repl combines the replication of a
process together with the creation of new channels and nonces. The channels #»c are implicitly
made public, but the newly created names #»n remain private. Remark that channels #»c
and names #»n must be fresh, i.e., they do not appear free in the original configuration. As
usual, freshness conditions do not block executions: it is always possible to rename bound
channels #»c and names #»n of a process !a#»c , #»nP before applying Repl. We denote by bc(tr)
the bound channels of a trace tr, i.e., all the channels that occur in second argument of an
action sess(a, #»c ) in tr, and we consider traces where channels are bound at most once.
I Example 4. Going back to Example 3 with Φ0 = {w1 7→ k}, we have that:
({!ac,nP0}; Φ0) sess(a, c)−−−−−→ out(c, w2)−−−−−→ in(c,M0)−−−−−→ ({out(c, ok).0; !ac,nP0}; Φ)
where Φ = {w1 7→ k,w2 7→ enc(n, k)} and M0 = enc(h(dec(w2, w1)), w1).
2.3 Equivalences
We are concerned with trace equivalence, which is used [8, 17] to model anonymity, un-
traceability, strong secrecy, etc. Finer behavioural equivalences, e.g., weak bisimulation,
appear to be too strong with respect to what an attacker can really observe. Intuitively, two
configurations are trace equivalent if the attacker cannot tell whether he is interacting with
one or the other. To make this formal, we introduce a notion of equivalence between frames.
I Definition 5. Two frames Φ and Φ′ are in static equivalence, written Φ ∼ Φ′, when
dom(Φ) = dom(Φ′), and: MΦ =E NΦ ⇔ MΦ′ =E NΦ′ for any terms M,N ∈ T (dom(Φ)).
I Example 6. Continuing Example 4, consider Φ′ = {w1 7→ k′, w2 7→ enc(n, k)}. The test
enc(dec(w2, w1), w1) = w2 is true in Φ but not in Φ′, thus Φ 6∼ Φ′.
We then define obs(tr) to be the subsequence of tr obtained by erasing τ actions.
I Definition 7. Let A and B be two configurations. We say that A v B when, for any
A tr−→ A′ such that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists B tr′−→ B′ such that obs(tr) = obs(tr′) and
Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). They are trace equivalent, written A ≈ B, when A v B and B v A.
In order to lift our optimised semantics to trace equivalence, we will require configurations
to be action-deterministic. This common assumption in POR techniques [7] is also reasonable
in the context of security protocols, where the attacker knows with whom he is communicating.
I Definition 8. A configuration A is action-deterministic if whenever A tr−→ (P ; Φ), and P,Q
are two elements of P, we have that P and Q cannot perform an observable action of the
same nature (in, out, or sess) on the same channel (i.e., if both actions are of same nature,
their first argument has to differ).
3 Annotated semantics
We shall now define an intermediate semantics whose transitions are equipped with more
informative actions. The annotated actions will notably feature labels ` ∈ N∗ indicating from
which concurrent processes they originate. A labelled action will be written [α]` where α is
an action and ` is a label. Similarly, a labelled process will be written [P ]`. When reasoning
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In/Out
({P} unionmulti P; Φ) α−−→ ({P ′} unionmulti P; Φ′)
({[P ]`} unionmulti P; Φ) [α]
`
−−−→a ({[P ′]`} unionmulti P; Φ′)
α ∈ {in(_,_); out(_,_)}
Repl ({[!a#»c , #»nP0]`} unionmulti P; Φ)
[sess(a, #»c )]`−−−−−−−−→a ({[P0]`·1, [!a#»c , #»nP0]`·2} unionmulti P; Φ) #»c , #»n fresh
Par ({[Πni=1Pi]`} unionmulti P; Φ)
[par(σpi(1);...;σpi(n))]`−−−−−−−−−−−−−→a ({[Ppi(1)]`·1, . . . , [Ppi(n)]`·n} unionmulti P; Φ)
σi = sk(Pi) and pi is a permutation over [1, ...n] such that σpi(1) ≤ . . . ≤ σpi(n)
Zero ({[0]`} unionmulti P; Φ) [zero]
`
−−−−→a (P; Φ)
Figure 1 Annotated semantics
about trace equivalence between two configurations, it will be crucial to maintain a consistent
labelling between configurations along the execution. In order to do so, we define skeletons
of observable actions, which are of the form inc, outc or !a where a, c ∈ C, and we assume
a total ordering over those skeletons, denoted < with ≤ its reflexive closure. Any process
that is neither 0 nor a parallel composition induces a skeleton corresponding to its toplevel
connective, and we denote it by sk(P ).
We define in Figure 1 the annotated semantics −→a over configurations whose processes
are labelled. In Par, note that sk(Pi) is well defined as Pi cannot be a zero or a parallel
composition. Also note that the label of an action is always that of the active process in
that transition. More importantly, the annotated transition system does not restrict the
executions of a process but simply annotates them with labels, and replaces τ actions by
more descriptive actions.
We now define how to extract sequential dependencies from labels, which will allow us to
analyse concurrency in a trace without referring to configurations.
I Definition 9. Two labels are dependent if one is a prefix of the other. We say that the
labelled actions α and β are sequentially dependent when their labels are dependent, and
recipe dependent when {α, β} = {[in(c,M)]`, [out(c′, w)]`′} with w occurring in M . They
are dependent when they are either sequentially or recipe dependent. Otherwise, they are
independent.
I Definition 10. A configuration (P ; Φ) is well labelled if P is a multiset of labelled processes
such that two elements of P have independent labels.
Obviously, any unlabelled configuration may be well labelled. Further, it is easy to see
that well labelling is preserved by −→a. Thus, we shall implicitly assume to be working with
well labelled configurations in the rest of the paper. Under this assumption, we obtain the
following fundamental lemma.
I Lemma 11. Let A be a (well labelled) configuration, α and β be two independent labelled
actions. We have A α.β−−→a A′ if, and only if, A β.α−−→a A′.
3.0.0.1 Symmetries of trace equivalence.
We will see that, when checking A ≈ B for action-deterministic configurations, it is sound to
require that B can perform all traces of A in the annotated semantics (and the converse).
In other words, labels and detailed non-observable actions zero and par(σ1 . . . σn) are
actually relevant for trace equivalence. Obviously, this can only hold if A and B are labelled
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consistently. In order to express this, we extend sk(P ) to parallel and zero processes: we
let their skeletons be the associated action in the annotated semantics. Next, we define
the labelled skeletons by skl([P ]`) = [sk(P )]`. When checking for equivalence of A and B,
we shall assume that skl(A) = skl(B), i.e., the configurations have the same set of labelled
skeletons. This technical condition is obviously not restrictive in practice.
I Example 12. Let A = ({[in(a, x).((out(b,m).P1) | P2)]0}; Φ) with P1 = in(c, y).0 and
P2 = in(d, z).0, and B the configuration obtained from A by swapping P1 and P2. We have
skl(A) = skl(B) = {[ina]0}. Consider the following trace:
tr = [in(a, ok)]0.[par({outb; ind})]0.[out(b, w)]0·1.[in(c, w)]0·1.[in(d,w)]0·2
Assuming outb < ind and ok ∈ Σ, we have A tr−→a A′. However, there is no B′ such that
B tr−→a B′, for two reasons. First, B cannot perform the second action since skeletons of
sub-processes of its parallel composition are {outb; inc}. Second, even if we ignored that
mismatch on a non-observable action, B would not be able to perform the action in(c, w)
with the right label. Such mismatches can actually be systematically used to show A 6≈ B,
as shown next.
I Lemma 13. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations such that A ≈ B and
skl(A) = skl(B). For any execution
A
[α1]`1−−−−→a A1 [α2]
`2−−−−→a . . . [αn]
`n−−−−→a An
with bc(α1. . . . αn) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists an execution
B
[α1]`1−−−−→a B1 [α2]
`2−−−−→a . . . [αn]
`n−−−−→a Bn
such that Φ(Ai) ∼ Φ(Bi) and skl(Ai) = skl(Bi) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4 Compression
Our first refinement of the semantics, which we call compression, is closely related to focusing
from proof theory [3]: we will assign a polarity to processes and constrain the shape of
executed traces based on those polarities. This will provide a first significant reduction of
the number of traces to consider when checking reachability-based properties such as secrecy,
and more importantly, equivalence-based properties in the action-deterministic case.
I Definition 14. A process P is positive if it is of the form in(c, x).Q, and it is negative
otherwise. A multiset of processes P is initial if it contains only positive or replicated
processes, i.e., of the form !a#»c , #»nQ.
The compressed semantics (see Figure 2) is built upon the annotated semantics. It
constrains the traces to follow a particular strategy, alternating between negative and positive
phases. It uses enriched configurations of the form (P;F ; Φ) where (P; Φ) is a labelled
configuration and F is either a process (signalling which process is under focus in the positive
phase) or ∅ (in the negative phase). The negative phase lasts until the configuration is
initial (i.e., unfocused with an initial underlying multiset of processes) and in that phase
we perform actions that decompose negative non-replicated processes. This is done using
the Neg rule, in a completely deterministic way. When the configuration becomes initial, a
positive phase starts: we choose one process and start executing the actions of that process
(only inputs, possibly preceded by a new session) without the ability to switch to another
process of the multiset, until a negative subprocess is released and we go back to the negative
phase. The active process in the positive phase is said to be under focus. Between any
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Start/In
P is initial (P ; Φ) in(c,M)−−−−−→a (P ′; Φ)
(P unionmulti {P};∅; Φ) foc(in(c,M))−−−−−−−−−→c (P;P ′; Φ)
Start/!
P is initial (!a#»c , #»nP ; Φ)
sess(a, #»c )−−−−−−→a ({!a#»c , #»nP ;Q}; Φ)
(P unionmulti {!a#»c , #»nP};∅; Φ)
foc(sess(a, #»c ))−−−−−−−−−−→c (P unionmulti {!a#»c , #»nP};Q; Φ)
Pos/In
(P ; Φ) in(c,M)−−−−−→a (P ′; Φ)
(P;P ; Φ) in(c,M)−−−−−−→c (P;P ′; Φ)
Neg
(P ; Φ) α−→a (P ′; Φ′)
(P unionmulti {P};∅; Φ) α−−→c (P unionmulti P ′;∅; Φ′)
α ∈ {par(_), zero, out(_,_)}
Release (P; [P ]`; Φ) [rel]
`
−−−−→c (P unionmulti {[P ]`};∅; Φ) when P is negative
Labels are implicitly set in the same way as in the annotated semantics. Neg is made
non-branching by imposing an arbitrary order on labelled skeletons of available actions.
Figure 2 Compressed semantics
two initial configurations, the compressed semantics executes a sequence of actions, called
blocks, of the form foc(α).tr+.rel.tr− where tr+ is a (possibly empty) sequence of input
actions, whereas tr− is a (possibly empty) sequence of out, par, and zero actions. Note
that, except for the choice of recipes, the compressed semantics is completely non-branching
when executing a block. It may branch only when choosing which block to execute.
4.1 Reachability
We now formalise the relationship between traces of the compressed and annotated semantics.
In order to do so, we translate between configuration and enriched configuration as follows:
d(P; Φ)e = (P;∅; Φ), b(P;∅; Φ)c = (P; Φ) and b(P;P ; Φ)c = (P unionmulti {P}; Φ).
Similarly, we map compressed traces to annotated ones:
bc = , bfoc(α).trc = α.btrc, brel.trc = btrc and bα.trc = α.btrc otherwise.
We observe that we can map any execution in the compressed semantics to an execution
in the annotated semantics. Indeed, a compressed execution is simply an annotated execution
with some annotations (i.e., foc and rel) indicating the start of a positive/negative phase.
I Lemma 15. For any configurations A, A′ and tr, A tr−→c A′ implies bAc btrc−−→a bA′c.
Going in the opposite direction is more involved. In general, mapping annotated executions
to compressed ones requires to reorder actions. Compressed executions also force negative
actions to be performed unconditionally, which we compensate by considering complete
executions of a configuration, i.e., executions after which no more action can be performed
except possibly the ones that consist in unfolding a replication (i.e., rule Repl). Inspired by
the positive trunk argument of [29], we show the following lemma.
I Lemma 16. Let A, A′ be two configurations and tr be such that A tr−→a A′ is complete.
There exists a trace trc, such that btrcc can be obtained from tr by swapping independent
labelled actions, and dAe trc−→c dA′e.
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Proof sketch. We proceed by induction on the length of a complete execution starting from A.
If A is not initial, then we need to execute some negative action using Neg: this action
must be present somewhere in the complete execution, and we can permute it with preceding
actions using Lemma 11. If A is initial, we analyse the prefix of input and session actions
and we extract a subsequence of that prefix that corresponds to a full positive phase. J
4.2 Equivalence
We now define compressed trace equivalence (≈c) and prove that it coincides with ≈.
I Definition 17. Let A and B be two configurations. We say that A vc B when, for any
A tr−→c A′ such that bc(tr)∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists B tr−→c B′ such that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). They
are compressed trace equivalent, denoted A ≈c B, if A vc B and B vc A.
Compressed trace equivalence can be more efficiently checked than regular trace equi-
valence. Obviously, it explores less interleavings by relying on −→c rather than −→. It also
requires that traces of one process can be played exactly by the other, including details
such as non-observable actions, labels, and focusing annotations. The subtleties shown
in Example 12 are crucial for the completeness of compressed equivalence w.r.t. regular
equivalence. Since the compressed semantics forces to perform available outputs before e.g.
input actions, some non-equivalences are only detected thanks to the labels and detailed
non-observable actions of our annotated semantics.
I Theorem 18. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations with skl(A) = skl(B).
We have A ≈ B if, and only if, dAe ≈c dBe.
Proof sketch. (⇒) Consider an execution dAe tr−→c A′. Using Lemma 15, we get A btrc−−→a bA′c.
Then, Lemma 13 yields B btrc−−→a B′ for some B′ such that Φ(bA′c) ∼ Φ(B′) and labelled
skeletons are equal all along the executions. Relying on those skeletons, we show that
positive/negative phases are synchronised, and thus dBe tr−→c B′′ for some B′′ with bB′′c = B′.
(⇐) Consider an execution A tr−→a A′. We first observe that it suffices to consider only complete
executions there. This allows us to get a compressed execution dAe trc−→c dA′e by Lemma 16.
Since dAe ≈c dBe, there exists B′ such that dBe trc−→c B′ with Φ(dA′e) ∼ Φ(B′). Thus we
have B btrcc−−→a bB′c but also B tr−→a bB′c thanks to Lemma 11. J
Improper blocks. Note that blocks of the form foc(α).tr+.rel.zero do not bring any new
information to the attacker. While it would be incorrect to fully ignore such improper blocks,
we can show that it is sufficient to consider them at the end of traces. We can thus consider
a further optimised compressed trace equivalence that only checks for proper traces, i.e., ones
that have at most one improper block and only at the end of trace. We have also shown that
this optimised compressed trace equivalence actually coincides with ≈c.
5 Reduction
Our compressed semantics cuts down interleavings by using a simple focused strategy.
However, this semantics does not analyse data dependency that happen when an input
depends on an output, and is thus unable to exploit the independency of blocks to reduce
interleavings. We tackle this problem now.
I Definition 19. Two blocks b1 and b2 are independent, written b1 ‖ b2, when all labelled
actions α1 ∈ b1 and α2 ∈ b2 are independent. Otherwise they are dependent, written b1 
 b2.
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Obviously, Lemma 11 tells us that independent blocks can be permuted in a trace without
affecting the executability and the result of executing that trace. But this notion is not very
strong since it considers fixed recipes, which are irrelevant (in the end, only the derived
messages matter) and can easily introduce spurious dependencies. Thus we define a stronger
notion of equivalence over traces, which allows permutations of independent blocks but also
changes of recipes that preserve messages. During these permutations, we will also require
that traces remain plausible, which is defined as follows: tr is plausible if for any input
in(c,M) such that tr = tr0.in(c,M).tr2 then M ∈ T (W) where W is the set of all handles
occurring in tr0. Given a block b, i.e. a sequence of the form foc(α).tr+.rel.tr−, we denote
by b+ (resp. b−) the part of b corresponding to the positive (resp. negative) phase, i.e.,
b+ = α.tr+ (resp. b− = tr−). We note (b1 =E b2)Φ when b+1 Φ =E b+2 Φ and b−1 = b−2 .
I Definition 20. Given a frame Φ, the relation ≡Φ is the smallest equivalence over plausible
compressed traces such that tr.b1.b2.tr′ ≡Φ tr.b2.b1.tr′ when b1 ‖ b2, and tr.b1.tr′ ≡Φ tr.b2.tr′
when (b1 =E b2)Φ.
I Lemma 21. Let A and A′ be two initial configurations such that A tr−→c A′. We have that
A tr
′−→c A′ for any tr′ ≡Φ(A′) tr.
We now turn to defining our reduced semantics, which is going to avoid the redundancies
identified above by only executing specific representatives in equivalence classes modulo ≡Φ.
More precisely, we shall only execute minimal traces according to some order, which we now
introduce. We assume an order ≺ on blocks that is insensitive to recipes, and such that
independent blocks are always strictly ordered in one way or the other. We finally define ≺lex
on compressed traces as the lexicographic extension of ≺ on blocks.
In order to incrementally build representatives that are minimal with respect to ≺lex,
we define a predicate that expresses whether a block b should be authorised after a given
trace tr. Intuitively, this is the case only when, for any block b′  b in tr, dependencies forbid
to swap b and b′. We define this with recipe dependencies first, then quantify over all recipes
to capture message dependencies.
I Definition 22. A block b is authorised after tr, noted tr . b, when tr = ; or tr = tr0.b0 and
either (i) b
 b0 or (ii) b ‖ b0, b0 ≺ b, and tr0 . b.
We finally define −→r as the least relation such that:
Init
A −→r A
Block A tr−→r (P;∅; Φ) (P;∅; Φ) b−→c A′
A tr.b−−→r A′
if tr . b′ for all b′
with (b′ =E b)Φ
Our reduced semantics only applies to initial configurations: otherwise, no block can be
performed. This is not restrictive since we can, without loss of generality, pre-execute
non-observable and output actions that may occur at top level.
5.1 Reachability
An easy induction on the compressed trace tr allows us to map an execution w.r.t. the
reduced semantics to an execution w.r.t. the compressed semantics.
I Lemma 23. For any configurations A and A′, A tr−→r A′ implies A tr−→c A′.
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Next, we show that our reduced semantics only explores specific representatives. Given a
frame Φ, a plausible trace tr is Φ-minimal if it is minimal1 in its equivalence class modulo
≡Φ.
I Lemma 24. Let A be an initial configuration and A′ = (P;∅; Φ) be a configuration such
that A tr−→c A′. We have that tr is Φ-minimal if, and only if, A tr−→r A′.
Proof sketch. In order to relate minimality and executability in the reduced semantics, let us
say that a trace is bad if it is of the form tr.b0 . . . bn.b′.tr′ where n ≥ 0, there exists a block b′′
such that (b′′ =E b′)Φ, we have bi ‖ b′′ for all i, and bi ≺ b′′ ≺ b0 for all i > 0. This pattern
is directly inspired by the characterisation of lexicographic normal forms by Anisimov and
Knuth in trace monoids [4]. We note that a trace that can be executed in the compressed
semantics can also be executed in the reduced semantics if, and only if, it is not bad. Since
the badness of a trace allows to swap b′ before b0, and thus obtain a smaller trace in the
class ≡Φ, we show that a bad trace cannot be Φ-minimal (and conversely). J
5.2 Equivalence
The reduced semantics induces an equivalence ≈r that we define similarly to the compressed
one, and we then establish its soundness and completeness w.r.t. ≈c.
I Definition 25. Let A and B be two configurations. We say that A vr B when, for every
A tr−→r A′ such that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists B tr−→r B′ such that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′).
They are reduced trace equivalent, denoted A ≈r B, if A vr B and B vr A.
I Theorem 26. Let A and B be two initial, action-deterministic configurations.
A ≈c B if, and only if, A ≈r B
Proof sketch. We first prove that tr ≡Φ tr′ iff tr ≡Ψ tr′ when Φ ∼ Ψ. (⇒) This implication is
then an easy consequence of Lemma 24. (⇐) We start by showing that it suffices to consider
a complete execution A tr−→c A′. Since A′ is initial, by taking trm to be a Φ(A′)-minimal trace
associated to tr, we obtain a reduced execution of A leading to A′. Using our hypothesis
A ≈r B, we obtain that B trm−−→r B′ with corresponding relations over frames. We finally
conclude that B tr−→c B′ using Lemma 21 and the result stated above. J
Improper blocks. Similarly as we did for the compressed semantics in Section 4, we can
further restrict ≈r to only check proper traces (see Appendix D).
6 Application
We have developed two successive refinements of the concrete semantics of our process algebra,
eventually obtaining a reduced semantics that achieves an optimal elimination of redundant
interleavings. However, the practical usability of these semantics in algorithms for checking
the equivalence of replication-free processes is far from immediate: indeed, all of our semantics
are still infinitely branching, because each input may be fed with arbitrary messages. We
now discuss how existing decision procedures based on symbolic execution [27, 15, 36, 11]
can be modified to decide our optimised equivalences rather than the regular one, before
presenting our implementation and experimental results.
1 Note that minimal traces are not unique, since only labelled skeletons are taken into account when
comparing actions. However, the redundancy induced by the choice of recipes is not a concern in
practice as it does not arise with the current constraint-based techniques for deciding trace equivalence.
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6.1 Symbolic execution
Our compressed semantics can easily be used as a replacement of the regular one, in any
tool whose algorithm is based on a forward exploration of the set of possible traces. This
modification is very lightweight, and already brings a significant optimisation. In order to
make use of our final, reduced semantics, we need to enter into the details of constraint
solving. In addition to imposing the compressed strategy, symbolic execution should be
modified to generate dependency constraints in order to reflect the data dependencies imposed
by our predicate tr . b. Actually, the generation of dependency constraints can be done in a
similar way as shown in [6] (even if the class of processes considered in [6] is more restrictive).
We simply illustrate the effect of these dependency constraints on a simple example.
I Example 27. We consider roles Ri := in(ci, x).if x = ok then out(ci, ok) where ok is a
public constant, and then consider a parallel composition of n such processes: Pn := Πni=1Ri.
Thanks to compression, we will only consider traces made of blocks, and obtained a first
exponential reduction of the state space. Now, assume that our order prioritizes blocks on ci
w.r.t. those on cj when i < j, and consider a trace starting with in(cj , ·).out(cj , wj). Trying
to continue the exploration with an input action on ci with i < j, the dependency constraint
added will impose that the recipe Ri used to feed the input on ci makes use of the previous
output to derive ok. Actually, this dependency constraint will impose more than that. Indeed,
imposing that Ri has to use wj is not very restrictive since in this example there are many
ways to rely on wj to derive ok, e.g. Ri = dec(enc(ok, wj), wj) or even Ri = wj .
Actually, according to our reduced semantics, this step will be possible only if the message
stored in wj is mandatory to derive the message expected in input on channel ci. In this
example, the conditional imposes that the recipe Ri leads to the message ok (at least to
pursue in the then branch), and even if there are many ways to derive ok, in any case the
content of wj is not mandatory for that. Thus, on this simple example, all the traces where
the action in(cj , ·) is performed after the block on cj with i < j will not be explored thanks
to our reduction technique.
The constraint solver is then modified in a non-invasive way: dependency constraints
are used to dismiss configurations when it becomes obvious that they cannot be satisfied.
The modified verification algorithm may explore symbolic traces that do not correspond to
Φ-minimal representatives (when dependency constraints cannot be shown to be infeasible)
but we will see that this approach allows us to obtain a very effective optimisation. Note that,
because we may over-approximate dependency constraints, we must ensure that constraint
resolution prunes executions in a symmetrical fashion for both processes being checked for
equivalence.
I Remark. A subtle point about compression is that it actually enhances reduction in a
symbolic setting. Consider the process P = in(c, x).out(c, n1).out(c, n2) in parallel with
Q = in(c′, x). If ≺ gives priority to Q, then Q can only be scheduled after P if its input
message requires the knowledge of one of the nonces n1 and n2 revealed by P . Thus we
have two symbolic interleavings, one of which is subject to a dependency constraint. Now,
we could have applied the ideas of reduction directly on actions rather than blocks but we
would have obtained three symbolic interleavings, reflecting the fact that if the input on c′
depends on only the first output nonce, it should be scheduled before the second output.
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6.2 Experimental results
The optimisations developed in the present paper have been implemented, following the
above approach, in the official version of the state of the art tool Apte [12]. We now report
on experimental results; sources and instructions for reproduction are available [25]. We only
show examples in which equivalence holds, because the time spent on inequivalent processes
is too sensitive to the order in which the (depth-first) exploration is performed.
Toy example. We consider again our simple example described in Section 6.1. We ran Apte
on Pn ≈ Pn for n = 1 to 22, on a single 2.67GHz Xeon core (memory is not relevant). We
performed our tests on the reference version and the versions optimised with the compressed
and reduced semantics respectively. The results are shown on the left graph of Figure 3,
in logarithmic scale: it confirms that each optimisation brings an exponential speedup, as
predicted by our theoretical analysis.
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Figure 3 Impact of optimisations on toy example (left) and Denning-Sacco (right).
Denning-Sacco protocol. We ran a similar benchmark, checking that Denning-Sacco ensures
strong secrecy in various scenarios. The protocol has three roles and we added processes
playing those roles in turn, starting with three processes in parallel. The results are plotted
on Figure 3. The fact that we add one role out of three at each step explains the irregular
growth in verification time. We still observe an exponential speedup for each optimisation.
Practical impact. Finally, we illustrate how our optimisations make Apte much more useful
in practice for investigating interesting scenarios. Verifying a single session of a protocol
brings little assurance into its security. In order to detect replay attacks and to allow the
attacker to compare messages that are exchanged, at least two sessions should be considered.
This means having at least four parallel processes for two-party protocols, and six when
a trusted third party is involved. This is actually beyond what the unoptimised Apte can
handle in a reasonable amount of time. We show below how many parallel processes could
be handled in 20 hours by the different versions of Apte on various use cases of protocols.
Protocol ref comp red Protocol ref comp red
Needham Schroeder (3-party) 4 6 7 Denning-Sacco (3-party) 5 9 10
Private Authent. (2-party) 4 7 7 WMF (3-party) 6 12 13
Yahalom (3-party) 4 5 5 E-Passport PA (2-party) 4 7 9
7 Related Work
The techniques we have presented borrow from standard ideas from concurrency theory,
trace theory and, perhaps more surprisingly, proof theory. Blending all these ingredients,
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and adapting them to the demanding framework of security protocols, we have come up
with partial order reduction techniques that can effectively be used in symbolic verification
algorithms for equivalence properties of security protocols. We now discuss related work, and
there is a lot of it given the huge success of POR techniques in various application areas. We
shall focus on the novel aspects of our approach, and explain why such techniques have not
been needed outside of security protocol analysis. These observations are not new: as pointed
out by Baier and Katoen [7], “[POR] is mainly appropriate to control-intensive applications
and less suited for data-intensive applications”; Clarke et al. [13] also remark that “In the
domain of model checking of reactive systems, there are numerous techniques for reducing
the state space of the system. One such technique is partial-order reduction. This technique
does not directly apply to [security protocol analysis] because we explicitly keep track of
knowledge of various agents, and our logic can refer to this knowledge in a meaningful way.”
We first compare our work with classical POR techniques. Then, we discuss more
specifically previous works that use POR in a symbolic execution setting, and comment on
previous work in the domain of security protocol analysis. We conclude the section with some
remarks on the relationship between our optimized semantics and focused proof systems.
7.1 Classical POR
Partial order reduction techniques have proved very useful in the domain of model checking
concurrent programs. Given a Labelled Transition System (LTS) and some property to
check (e.g., a Linear Temporal Logic formula), the basic idea of POR [31, 24, 7] is to
only consider a reduced version of the given LTS whose enable transitions of some states
might be not exhaustive but are such that this transformation does not affect the property.
POR techniques can be categorized in two groups [24]. First, the persistent set techniques
(e.g.,stubborn sets, ample sets) where only a sufficiently representative subset of available
transitions is explored. Second, sleep set techniques memoize past exploration and use this
information along with available transitions to disable some provably redundant transitions.
Note that these two kinds of techniques are compatible, and are indeed often combined to
obtain better reductions. Theoretical POR techniques apply to transition systems which
may not be explicitly available in practice, or whose explicit computation may be too costly.
In such cases, POR is often applied to an approximation of the LTS that is obtained through
static analysis. Another, more recent approach is to use dynamic POR [20, 34, 2] where the
POR arguments are applied based on information that is obtained during the execution of
the system.
Clearly, classical POR techniques would apply to our concrete LTS, but that would not
be practically useful since this LTS is wildly infinite, taking into account all recipes that
the attacker could build. Applying most classical POR techniques to the LTS from which
data would have been abstracted away would be ineffective: any input would be dependent
with any output (since the attacker’s knowledge, increased by the output, may enable new
input messages). Our compression technique lies between these two extremes. It exploits a
semi-commutation property: outputs can be permuted before inputs, but not the converse in
general. Further, it exploits the fact that inputs do not increase the attacker’s knowledge,
and can thus be executed in a chained fashion, under focus. The semi-commutation is
reminiscent of the asymmetrical dependency analysis enabled by the conditional stubborn set
technique [24], and the execution of inputs under focus may be explained by means of sleep
sets. While it may be possible to formally derive our compressed semantics by instantiating
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abstract POR techniques to our setting, we have not explored this possibility in detail2.
As mentioned earlier, the compressed semantics is inspired from another technique, namely
focusing [3] from proof theory. Concerning our reduced semantics, it may be seen as an
application of the sleep set technique (or even as a reformulation of Anisimov’s and Knuth’s
characterization of lexicographic normal forms) but the real contribution with this technique
is to have formulated it in such a way that it can be implemented without requiring an a
priori knowledge of data dependencies: it allows us to eliminate redundant traces on-the-fly
as data (in)dependency is discovered by the constraint resolution procedure (more on this in
the next sections) — in this sense, it may be viewed as a case of dynamic POR.
Narrowing the discussion a bit more, we now focus on the fact that our techniques
are designed for the verification of equivalence properties. This requirement turns several
seemingly trivial observations into subtle technical problems. For instance, ideas akin to
compression are often applied without justification (e.g., in [32, 34, 30]) because they are
obvious when one does reachability rather than equivalence checking. To understand this, it
is important to distinguish between two very different ways of applying POR to equivalence
checking (independently of the precise equivalence under consideration). The first approach is
to reduce a system such that the reduced system and the original systems are equivalent. In
the second approach, one only requires that two reduced systems are equivalent iff the original
systems are equivalent. The first approach seems to be more common in the POR litterature
(where one finds, e.g., reductions that preserve LTL-satisfiability [7] or bisimilarity [26])
though there are instances of the second approach (e.g., for Petri nets [23]). In the present
work, we follow the second approach: neither of our two reduction techniques preserves
trace equivalence. This allows stronger reductions but requires extra care: one has to ensure
that the independencies used in the reduction of one process are also meaningful for the
other processes; in other words, reduction has to be symmetrical. This is the purpose of
our annotated semantics and its “strong symmetry lemma” (Lemma 13) but also, for the
reduced semantics, of Lemma 24 and Proposition 41. We come back to these two different
approaches later, when discussing specific POR techniques for security.
7.2 Infinite data and symbolic execution
Symbolic execution is often used to verify systems dealing with infinite data, e.g., recipes and
messages in security; integers, list, etc. in program verification. In many works combining
POR and symbolic executions (e.g., [32, 33, 34]) the detection of redundant explorations
does not rely on the data, and can thus be done trivially at the level of symbolic executions.
In such cases, POR and symbolic execution are orthogonal. For instance, in [32], two actions
are data-dependent if one actions is a send action of some message m to some process p
and the other is a receive action of process p. This is done independently of m, which is
meaningful when one considers internal reduction (as is the case that work) but would be too
coarse when one considers labelled transitions representing interactions with an environment
that may construct arbitrary recipes from previous outputs (as is the case in our work). Due
to this omnipotent attacker, POR techniques cannot be effective in our setting unless they
really take data into account. Further, due to the infinite nature of data, and the dynamic
2 Although this would be an interesting question, we do not expect that any improvement of compression
would come out of it. Indeed, compression can be argued to be maximal in terms of eliminating
redundant traces without analyzing data: for any compressed trace there is a way to choose messages
and modify tests to obtain a concrete execution which does not belong to the equivalence class of any
other compressed trace.
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extension of the attacker’s knowledge, POR and symbolic execution must be integrated
rather than orthogonal. Our notion of independence and trace monoid are tailored to take
all this into account, including at the level of trace equivalence (cf. again Lemma 24). And,
although reduction is presented (Section 5) in the concrete semantics, the crucial point is that
the authorised predicate (Definition 22) is implemented as a special dependency constraint
(Section 6) so that our POR algorithm fundamentally relies on symbolic execution. We have
not seen such uses of POR outside of the security applications mentioned next [30, 6].
7.3 Security applications
The idea of applying POR to the verification of security protocols dates back, at least, to
the work of Clarke et al. [13, 14]. In this work, the authors remark that traditional POR
techniques cannot be directly applied to security mainly because “[they] must keep track of
knowledge of various agents” and “[their] logic can refer to this knowledge in a meaningful
way”. This led them to define a notion of semi-invisible actions (output actions, that cannot
be swapped after inputs but only before them) and design a reduction that prioritizes outputs
and performs them in a fixed order. Compared to our work, this reduction is much weaker
(even weaker than compression only), only handles a finite set of messages, and only focuses
on reachability properties checking.
In [19], the authors develop “state space reduction” techniques for the Maude-NRL
Protocol Analyzer (Maude-NPA). This tool proceeds by backwards reachability analysis and
treats at the same level the exploration of protocol executions and attacker’s deductions.
Several reductions techniques are specific to this setting, and most are unrelated to partial
order reduction in general, and to our work in particular. We note that the lazy intruder
techniques from [19] should be compared to what is done in constraint resolution procedures
(e.g., the one used in Apte) rather than to our work. A simple POR technique used in
Maude-NPA is based on the observation that inputs can be executed in priority in the
backwards exploration, which corresponds to the fact that we can execute outputs first in
forward explorations. We note again that this is only one aspect of the focused strategy, and
that it is not trivial to lift this observation from reachability to trace equivalence. Finally, a
“transition subsumption” technique is described for Maude-NPA. While highly non-trivial
due to the technicalities of the model, this is essentially a tabling technique rather than a
partial order reduction. Though it does yield a significant state space reduction (as shown in
the experiments [19]) it falls short of exploiting independencies fully, and has a potentially
high computational cost (which is not evaluated in the benchmarks of [19]).
In [21], Fokkink et al. model security protocols as labeled transition systems whose states
contain the control points of different agents as well as previously outputted messages. They
devise some POR technique for these transition systems, where output actions are prioritized
and performed in a fixed order. In their work, the original and reduced systems are trace
equivalent modulo outputs (the same traces can be found after removing output actions). The
justification for their reduction would fail in our setting, where we consider standard trace
equivalence with observable outputs. More importantly, their requirement that a reduced
system should be equivalent to the original one makes it impossible to swap input actions,
and thus reductions such as the execution under focus of our compressed semantics cannot
be used. The authors leave as future work the problem of combining their algorithm with
symbolic executions, in order to be able to lift the restriction to a finite number of messages.
Cremers and Mauw proposed [16] a reduction technique based on the sleep set idea.
Basically, when their exploration algorithm chooses to explore a specific action (an output
or an input with its corresponding message), it will also add all the other available actions
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that have priority over the chosen one to the current sleep set. An action in this sleep set
will never been explored. In this work, only reachability property are considered, and the
reduction cannot be directly applied to trace equivalence checking. More importantly, the
technique can only handle a finite set of messages. The authors identify as important future
work the need to lift their method to the symbolic setting.
Earlier work by Mödersheim et al. has shown how to combine POR technique with
symbolic semantics [30] in the context of reachability properties for security protocols,
which has led to high efficiency gains in the OFMC tool of the AVISPA platform [5].
While their reduction is very limited, it brings some key insight on how POR may be
combined with symbolic execution. In a model where actions are sequences of outputs
followed by inputs, their reduction imposes a differentiation constraint on the interleavings of
in(c, x).out(c,m) | in(d, y).out(d,m′). This constraint enforces that the symbolic interleav-
ing in(d,M ′).out(d,w′).in(c,M).out(c, w) should only be explored for instances of M that
depend on w′. Our reduced semantics constrains patterns of arbitrary size (instead of just size
2 diamond patterns as above) by means of the authorised predicate (Definition 22). Moreover,
our POR technique has beed designed to be sound and complete for trace equivalence checking
as well.
In a previous work [6], we settled the general ideas for the POR techniques presented
in the present paper, but results were much weaker. That earlier work only dealt with the
restrictive class of simple processes, which does not feature nested parallel composition or
replication, and made heavy use of specific properties of processes of that class to define
reductions and prove them correct. In the present work, we show that our two reduction
techniques apply to a very large class of processes for reachability checking. For equivalence
checking, we only require the semantic condition of action-determinism. Note that the results
of the present paper are conservative over those of [6]: the reductions of [6] are obtained as
a particular case of the results presented here in the case of simple processes. Finally, the
present work brings a solid implementation in the state of the art tool Apte [10], whereas [6]
did not present experimental results — it mentioned a preliminary implementation, extending
SPEC, which we abandoned since it was difficult to justify and handled a more restricted
class than APTE.
7.4 Relationship with focused proof systems
The reader familiar with focused proof systems [3] will have recognized the strong similarities
with our compressed semantics. The strategies are structured in the same way, around
positive and negative phases. More deeply, the compressed semantics can actually be derived
systematically from the focused proof system of linear logic, through an encoding of our
processes into linear logic formulas (such that proof search corresponds to process executions).
There are several such encodings in the literature, see for instance [28, 22, 18]. We do not
provide here a fully worked-out encoding appropriate for our protocols. It is not trivial,
notably due to the need to encode the attacker’s knowledge, and internal reductions of
protocols — both features require slight extensions of the usual linear logic framework. We
have thus chosen to only take the correspondence with linear logic as an intuitive guide, and
give a self-contained (and simple) proof of completeness for our compressed semantics by
adapting the positive trunk argument of [29]. Note that the strong analogies with proof
theory only hold for reachability results, i.e., up to Lemma 16. It is a contribution of this
paper to observe that focusing (compression) makes sense beyond reachability, at the level of
trace equivalence: Theorem 18 (stating that trace equivalence coincides with compressed
trace equivalence for action-deterministic processes) has no analogue in the proof theoretical
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setting, where trace equivalence itself is meaningless.
We motivated reduction by observing that (in)dependencies between blocks of the com-
pressed semantics should be exploited to eliminate redundant interleavings. This same
observation has been done in the context of linear logic focusing, and lead to the idea of
multi-focusing [9] where independent synthetic connectives (the analogue of our blocks)
are executed simultaneously as much as possible. That work on multi-focusing is purely
theoretical, and it is unclear how multi-focusing could be applied effectively in proof search.
It would be interesting to consider whether the gradual construction of unique representatives
in our reduced semantics could be extended to the richer setting of linear logic (where proof
search branches, unlike process executions).
8 Conclusion
We have developed two POR techniques that are adequate for verifying reachability and
trace equivalence properties of action-deterministic security protocols. We have effectively
implemented them in Apte, and shown that they yield the expected, significant benefit.
We are considering several directions for future work. Regarding the theoretical results
presented here, the main question is whether we can get rid of the action-determinism
condition without degrading our reductions too much. Regarding the practical application
of our results, we can certainly go further. We first note that our compression technique
should be applicable and useful in other verification tools, not necessarily based on symbolic
execution. Next, we could investigate the role of the particular choice of the order ≺, to
determine heuristics for maximising the practical impact of reduction. Finally, we plan
to adapt our treatment of replication to bounded replication to obtain a first symmetry
elimination scheme, which should provide a significant optimisation when studying security
protocols with several sessions.
References
1 M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile values, new names, and secure communication. In
Proceedings of POPL’01. ACM Press, 2001.
2 Parosh Abdulla, Stavros Aronis, Bengt Jonsson, and Konstantinos Sagonas. Optimal dy-
namic partial order reduction. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 49(1):373–384, 2014.
3 Jean-Marc Andreoli. Logic programming with focusing proofs in linear logic. J. Log.
Comput., 2(3), 1992.
4 A.V. Anisimov and D.E. Knuth. Inhomogeneous sorting. International Journal of Com-
puter & Information Sciences, 8(4):255–260, 1979.
5 A. Armando et al. The AVISPA Tool for the automated validation of internet security
protocols and applications. In Proc. 17th Int. Conference on Computer Aided Verification
(CAV’05), LNCS. Springer, 2005.
6 David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi. A reduced semantics for deciding
trace equivalence using constraint systems. In Proceedings of POST’14. Springer, 2014.
7 Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen. Principles of Model Checking (Representation and
Mind Series). The MIT Press, 2008.
8 Mayla Bruso, K. Chatzikokolakis, and J. den Hartog. Formal verification of privacy for
RFID systems. In Proceedings of CSF’10, 2010.
9 Kaustuv Chaudhuri, Dale Miller, and Alexis Saurin. Canonical sequent proofs via multi-
focusing. In Giorgio Ausiello, Juhani Karhumäki, Giancarlo Mauri, and C.-H. Luke Ong,
editors, Fifth IFIP International Conference On Theoretical Computer Science - TCS 2008,
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
IFIP 20th World Computer Congress, TC 1, Foundations of Computer Science, September
7-10, 2008, Milano, Italy, volume 273 of IFIP, pages 383–396. Springer, 2008.
10 Vincent Cheval. Apte: an algorithm for proving trace equivalence. In Proceedings
TACAS’14. Springer, 2014.
11 Vincent Cheval, Hubert Comon-Lundh, and Stéphanie Delaune. Trace equivalence decision:
Negative tests and non-determinism. In Proceedings of CCS’11. ACM Press, 2011.
12 Vincent Cheval and Lucca Hirschi. sources of APTE, 2015. Available at https://github.
com/APTE/APTE.
13 Edmund Clarke, Somesh Jha, and Will Marrero. Partial order reductions for security
protocol verification. In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems,
pages 503–518. Springer, 2000.
14 Edmund M. Clarke, Somesh Jha, and Wilfredo R. Marrero. Efficient verification of secur-
ity protocols using partial-order reductions. International Journal on Software Tools for
Technology Transfer, 4(2), 2003.
15 H. Comon-Lundh, V. Cortier, and E. Zalinescu. Deciding security properties for crypto-
graphic protocols. Application to key cycles. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic
(TOCL), 11(4), 2010.
16 Cas JF Cremers and Sjouke Mauw. Checking secrecy by means of partial order reduction.
In System Analysis and Modeling. Springer, 2005.
17 Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Mark D. Ryan. Verifying privacy-type properties of
electronic voting protocols: A taster. In Towards Trustworthy Elections – New Directions
in Electronic Voting, volume 6000. Springer, 2010.
18 Yuxin Deng, Iliano Cervesato, and Robert J. Simmons. Relating reasoning methodologies
in linear logic and process algebra. In LINEARITY, volume 101 of EPTCS, 2012.
19 Santiago Escobar, Catherine Meadows, José Meseguer, and Sonia Santiago. State space
reduction in the maude-nrl protocol analyzer. Inf. Comput., 238:157–186, 2014.
20 Cormac Flanagan and Patrice Godefroid. Dynamic partial-order reduction for model check-
ing software. In ACM Sigplan Notices, volume 40, pages 110–121. ACM, 2005.
21 Wan Fokkink, Mohammad Torabi Dashti, and Anton Wijs. Partial order reduction for
branching security protocols. In Proceedings of ACSD’10. IEEE, 2010.
22 Deepak Garg and Frank Pfenning. Type-directed concurrency. In CONCUR, volume 3653
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2005.
23 Patrice Godefroid. Using partial orders to improve automatic verification methods. In
Computer-Aided Verification, pages 176–185. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991.
24 Patrice Godefroid, J van Leeuwen, J Hartmanis, G Goos, and Pierre Wolper. Partial-
order methods for the verification of concurrent systems: an approach to the state-explosion
problem, volume 1032. Springer Heidelberg, 1996.
25 Lucca Hirschi. APTE with POR, 2015. Available at http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/
~hirschi/apte_por.
26 Michaela Huhn, Peter Niebert, and Heike Wehrheim. Partial order reductions for bisimula-
tion checking. In Vikraman Arvind and Ramaswamy Ramanujam, editors, Foundations of
Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, 18th Conference, Chennai, India,
December 17-19, 1998, Proceedings, volume 1530 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 271–282. Springer, 1998.
27 J. Millen and V. Shmatikov. Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol
analysis. In Proceedings of CCS’01. ACM Press, 2001.
28 Dale Miller. Encryption as an abstract data type. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 84,
2003.
29 Dale Miller and Alexis Saurin. From proofs to focused proofs: A modular proof of focaliz-
ation in linear logic. In Proceedings of CSL’07, volume 4646. Springer, 2007.
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
30 Sebastian Mödersheim, Luca Viganò, and David A. Basin. Constraint differentiation:
Search-space reduction for the constraint-based analysis of security protocols. Journal
of Computer Security, 18(4), 2010.
31 Doron Peled. Ten years of partial order reduction. In Proceedings of CAV’98, volume 1427.
Springer, 1998.
32 Koushik Sen and Gul Agha. Automated systematic testing of open distributed programs.
In Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering, pages 339–356. Springer, 2006.
33 Stephen F Siegel, Anastasia Mironova, George S Avrunin, and Lori A Clarke. Using model
checking with symbolic execution to verify parallel numerical programs. In Proceedings of
the 2006 international symposium on Software testing and analysis, pages 157–168. ACM,
2006.
34 Samira Tasharofi, Rajesh K Karmani, Steven Lauterburg, Axel Legay, Darko Marinov, and
Gul Agha. Transdpor: A novel dynamic partial-order reduction technique for testing actor
programs. In Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems, pages 219–234. Springer, 2012.
35 Alwen Tiu. Spec: http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~tiu/spec/, 2010.
36 Alwen Tiu and Jeremy E. Dawson. Automating open bisimulation checking for the spi
calculus. In Proceedings of CSF’10. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2010.
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
A Annotated semantics
A.1 Reachability
I Proposition 28. Well labelling is preserved by −→a.
Proof. For all transitions except Par and Repl, the multiset of labels of the resulting
configuration is a subset of labels of the original configuration. Thus, well labelling is
obviously preserved in those cases.
Consider now a Par transition, represented below without the permutation, which does
not play a role here:
([{Πni=1Pi}]`} unionmulti P; Φ) [par(σ1, . . . , σn)]
`−−−−−−−−−→ ({[P1]`·1, . . . , [Pn]`·n} unionmulti P; Φ)
We check that labels are pairwise independent. This is obviously the case for the new labels
` · i. Let us now consider a label `′ from P and show that it is independent from any ` · i. It
cannot be equal to one of them (otherwise it would be a suffix of `, which contradicts the
well labelling of the initial configuration) and it cannot be a strict prefix either (otherwise it
would be a prefix of ` too). Finally, ` · i cannot be a prefix of `′ because ` is not a prefix of `′.
As far as labels are concerned, Repl transitions are a particular case of Par where there
are only two sub-processes. Thus Repl preserves well labelling. J
I Lemma (11). Let A be a (well labelled) configuration, α and β be two independent labelled
actions. We have A α.β−−→a A′ if, and only if, A β.α−−→a A′.
Proof. By symmetry it is sufficient to show one implication. Assuming `1 and `2 to be
independent, we consider a transition labelled α = [α′]`1 followed by one labelled β = [β′]`2 .
We first observe that a transition labelled `1 can only generate new labels that are dependent
with `1. Thus, `2 must be present in the original configuration and our execution is of the
following form, where we write Pα (resp. Pβ) instead of [Pα]`1 (resp. [Pβ ]`2):
A = (P unionmulti {Pα, Pβ}; Φ) [α]`1−−→ (P unionmulti Pα unionmulti {Pβ}; Φα) [β]`2−−→ (P unionmulti Pα unionmulti Pβ ; Φβ)
It remains to check that β can be performed by Pβ in the original configuration, and that
doing so would not prevent the α transition to happen next. The only thing that could
prevent β from being performed is that the frames Φ and Φα may be different, in the case
where α is an input. In that case, the recipe independence hypothesis guarantees that β does
not rely on the new handle introduced by α and can thus be played with only Φ. Finally,
performing α after β is easy. We only detail the case where β = out(c, w) and α is an input
of recipe M . In that case we have Φα = Φ, Φβ = Φα unionmulti {w 7→ m}, and M ∈ T (dom(Φ)). We
observe that M ∈ T (dom(Φβ)) and we construct the execution:
A = (P unionmulti {[Pα]`1 , [Pβ ]`2}; Φ) [β]`2−−→ (P unionmulti Pβ unionmulti {[Pα]`1}; Φβ) [α]`1−−→ (P unionmulti Pα unionmulti Pβ ; Φβ)
J
A.2 Equivalence
I Definition 29. Given a process P , we define the set of its enabled skeletons as
enable(P ) =

{sk(P )} if P starts with an observable action
∪i{sk(Pi)} if P = ΠiPi
∅ if P = 0
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We may consider skeletons, labelled skeletons and enabled skeletons of a configuration by
taking the set of the corresponding objects of all its processes.
I Property 30. For any configurations A, A′ and non-observable action α, if A α−→a A′ or
A τ−→ A′ then enable(A) = enable(A′).
I Property 31. Let A be an action-deterministic configuration and P , Q two of its processes.
We have that enable(P ) ∩ enable(Q) = ∅.
I Lemma 32. Let A be an action-deterministic configuration. If A tr1−→ A1 and A tr2−→ A2
for some traces tr1, tr2 such that obs(tr1) = obs(tr2) then enable(A1) = enable(A2) and
Φ(A1) = Φ(A2).
Proof. We first prove a stronger result when the configurations A1 and A2 are canonical, i.e.
only contain processes that are neither 0 nor a parallel composition. Actually, in such a case,
we prove that A1 = A2.
To prove this intermediate result, we proceed by induction on obs(tr1). The base case is
trivial. Let us show the inductive case. We assume that tr1 = tr01.α.tr−1 with α an observable
action and tr−1 containing only non-observable actions. Since obs(tr1) = obs(tr2), we have
that tr2 = tr02.α.tr−2 with tr−2 containing only non-observable actions and obs(tr01) = obs(tr02).
Our given executions are thus of the form:
A tr
0
1−→ A01 α.tr
−
1−−−→ A1 and A tr02−→ A02 α.tr
−
2−−−→ A2
It may be the case that A01 or A02 are not canonical. The idea is to reorder some non-
observable actions. More precisely, we perform all available non-observable actions of A01
and A02 before performing α. By doing this, we do not change the observable actions of the
different sub-traces and obtain
A tr
0
1.tr−3−−−→ A′01 α.tr
′−
1−−−→ A1 and A tr02.tr−4−−−→ A′02 α.tr
′−
2−−−→ A2
with A′01 and A′02 canonical. By inductive hypothesis, we have that A′01 = A′02 . We now must
show A1 = A2. By action-determinism of A, there is only one process P that can perform
α in A′01 (= A′02 ). The resulting process P ′ after performing α is thus the same in the two
executions. Since A1 and A2 are canonical and tr′−1 and tr′−2 contain only non-observable
actions, A1 = A2.
In order to be able to apply our previous result, we complete the executions with all
available non-observable actions:
A tr1−→ A1 tr−1−−→ A′1 and A tr2−→ A2 tr
−
1−−→ A′2
such that A1 and A2 are canonical and tr−1 and tr−2 contain only non-observable actions. We
also have that:
Φ(A1) = Φ(A′1) and enable(A1) = enable(A′1); and
Φ(A2) = Φ(A′2) and enable(A2) = enable(A′2).
We now conclude thanks to our previous result, and obtain A′1 = A′2 implying the desired
equalities. J
I Proposition 33. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations such that A ≈ B.
If A trA−−→ A′ and B trB−−→ B′ with obs(trA) = obs(trB) then Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′) and enable(A′) =
enable(B′).
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Proof. By hypothesis, we know that A ≈ B, and also that A trA−−→ A′. Moreover, the freshness
conditions on channels (i.e., bc(trA) ∩ fc(B) = ∅) holds as B is able to perform trB , and trA
and trB share the same bound channels. Hence, we know that there exist tr′B and B′′ such
that
B tr
′
B−−→ B′′, obs(trA) = obs(tr′B), and Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′′).
Now, since B is an action-deterministic configuration, applying Lemma 32 on trB and tr′B,
we obtain that enable(B′) = enable(B′′) and Φ(B′) = Φ(B′′). This allows us to conclude
that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′).
It remains to show that enable(A′) = enable(B′). By symmetry, we only show one
inclusion. Let αs ∈ enable(A′), we shall show that αs ∈ enable(B′). We deduce from the
latter that there is a trace tr′ that is either α or τ.α (where α is an observable action whose
the skeleton is αs) such that
A trA−−→ A′ tr′−→ A0
for some A0. Since A ≈ B, we know that there exist tr′0, tr′, B′0, and B′ such that
B tr
′
0−→ B′0 tr
′−→ B0
with Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0) and obs(trA) = obs(tr′0) and obs(tr′) = α. we have that α ∈ enable(B′0).
In particular, using Property 30, we have that αs ∈ enable(B′0).
Now, since B is an action-deterministic configuration, applying Lemma 32 on trB and tr′0
we obtain enable(B′) = enable(B′0), and thus αs ∈ enable(B′). J
I Proposition 34. Let A be an action-deterministic configuration and P,Q two of its
processes. If enable(P ) = enable(Q) then sk(P ) = sk(Q).
Proof. Let us show that sk(P ) = sk(Q). If enable(P ) is an empty set then P = 0 and thus
from enable(Q) = ∅ we deduce that Q = 0 as well implying the required equality on skeletons.
If enable(P ) is a singleton then it must be {sk(P )} — we cannot be in the case where P is a
parallel composition, for in that case there would be at least two skeletons in enable(P ) by
action-determinism of A. The same goes with Q thus we have {sk(P )} = {sk(Q)}. Finally,
if enable(P ) contains at least two skeletons then it must be the case that P is a parallel
composition of the form ΠiPi and enable(P ) = ∪i{sk(Pi)}. Similarly, Q must be of the form
ΠiQi and enable(Q) = ∪i{sk(Qi)}. Here, we make use of action-determinism to obtain that
the number of subprocesses in parallel is the same as the cardinality of the sets of skeletons,
and thus the same for P and Q: indeed, no two parallel subprocesses can have the same
skeleton. We conclude that sk(P ) = par(S) where S is the ordered sequence of skeletons
from ∪i{sk(Pi)}, and sk(Q) = par(S) where S is the ordered sequence of skeletons from
∪i{sk(Qi)} = ∪i{sk(Pi)}. J
I Lemma (13). Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations such that A ≈ B
and skl(A) = skl(B). For any execution
A
[α1]`1−−−−→a A1 [α2]
`2−−−−→a . . . [αn]
`n−−−−→a An
with bc(α1. . . . αn) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists an execution
B
[α1]`1−−−−→a B1 [α2]
`2−−−−→a . . . [αn]
`n−−−−→a Bn
such that Φ(Ai) ∼ Φ(Bi) and skl(Ai) = skl(Bi) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Proof. We show this result by induction on the length of the derivation A tr−→ An. The case
where tr is empty (i.e., no action even a non-observable one) is obvious. Assume that we
have proved such a result for all the executions of length n, and we want to establish the
result for an execution of length n+ 1.
Consider an execution of [α1]`1 . . . [αn]`n from A to An, followed by [αn+1]`n+1 towards
An+1. By induction hypothesis, we know that there exists an execution
B [α1]
`1−−−→ B1 [α2]`2−−−→ . . . [αn]`n−−−→ Bn
such that Φ(An) ∼ Φ(Bn) and skl(Ai) = skl(Bi) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It remains to establish that
there exists Bn+1 such that Bn can perform [αn+1]`n+1 towards Bn+1, Φ(An+1) ∼ Φ(Bn+1)
and skl(An+1) = skl(Bn+1). We distinguish several cases depending on the action αn+1.
Case αn+1 = zero. We have that [zero]`n+1 ∈ skl(An), and thus, since skl(An) = skl(Bn),
we have also that [zero]`n+1 ∈ sk(Bn). We deduce that An = ({[0]`n+1} unionmulti P0; Φ0), and
Bn = ({[0]`n+1} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) for some P0, Q0, Φ0, and Ψ0. Moreover, since skl(An) = skl(Bn),
we deduce that skl(P0) = skl(Q0). Let Bn+1 = (Q0; Ψ0). We have that:
Bn = ({[0]`n+1} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) [zero]`n+1−−−−−→ (Q0; Ψ0) = Bn+1,
Φ(An+1) = Φ(An) ∼ Φ(Bn) = Φ(Bn+1), and
skl(An+1) = skl(P0) = skl(Q0) = skl(Bn+1).
Case αn+1 = par(S) for some sequence S = (β1, . . . , βk). Note that this sequence is
ordered according to our order < over skeletons (i.e., β1 < . . . < βk) and βi’s are pairwise
distinct by action-determinism of A. We have [par(S)]`n+1 ∈ skl(An), and thus, since
skl(An) = skl(Bn), we have also that [par(S)]`n+1 ∈ skl(Bn). An = ({[Πki=1Pi]`n+1}unionmultiP0; Φ0),
unionmultiki=1sk(Pi) = {β1, . . . , βk} and Bn = ({[Πki=1Qi]`n+1} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) for some Pi, Qi, P0, Q0, Φ0,
and Ψ0. Further, we have
An+1 = (unionmultiki=1{[Ppi(i)]`n+1i} unionmulti P0; Φ0)
for some permutation pi over [1; k] such that sk(Ppi(i)) = βi for all i. Moreover, since
skl(An) = skl(Bn), we deduce that skl(P0) = skl(Q0), and
{sk(Pi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} = {sk(Qi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} = {β1, . . . , βk}
Remark that, since Pi (resp. Qi) cannot be a zero or a parallel we have that enable(Pi) =
{sk(Pi)} (resp. enable(Qi) = {sk(Qi)}) and those sets are singletons. Moreover, by action-
determinism of A and B we know that all those singletons are pairwise disjoint. From this,
we conclude that there exists a permutation pi′ over [1; k] such that
∀i, sk(Qpi′(i)) = βi = sk(Ppi(i))
and thus
∀i, skl([Qpi′(i)]`n+1i) = skl([Ppi(i)]`n+1i)
We can finally let Bn+1 be (unionmultiki=1{[Qpi′(i)]`n+1i} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) and we have:
Bn = ({[Πki=1Qi]`n+1} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) [par(S)]
`n+1−−−−−−−→ (unionmultiki=1{[Qpi′(i)]`n+1i} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0) = Bn+1,
Φ(An+1) = Φ(An) ∼ Φ(Bn) = Φ(Bn+1), and
skl(An+1) = skl(P0) unionmulti
⊎k
i=1 skl([Ppi(i)]`n+1i)
= skl(Q0) unionmulti
⊎k
i=1 skl([Qpi′(i)]`n+1i) = skl(Bn+1).
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Case αn+1 = in(c,M) for some c, and M with M ∈ T (dom(Φ(An)). We have that
[inc]`n+1 ∈ skl(An), and thus, since skl(An) = skl(Bn), we have [inc]`n+1 ∈ skl(Bn). We
deduce that An = ({[in(c, xA).P ]`n+1}unionmultiP0; Φ0), and Bn = ({[in(c, xB).Q]`n+1}unionmultiQ0; Ψ0) for
some xA, xB , P , Q, P0, Q0, Φ0, and Ψ0. Since A ≈ B and thus dom(Φ(A)) = dom(Φ(B)),
we have that dom(Φ0) = dom(Ψ0). Moreover, since skl(An) = skl(Bn), we deduce that
skl(P0) = skl(Q0). Let Bn+1 = ([Q{uB/xB}]`n+1 unionmultiQ0; Ψ0) where uB = MΨ0. We have that:
Bn
[in(c,M)]`n+1−−−−−−−−→ Bn+1, and
Φ(An+1) = Φ(An) ∼ Φ(Bn) = Φ(Bn+1).
It remains to show that skl(An+1) = skl(Bn+1). Since we have that skl(P0) = skl(Q0), and
the label of the new subprocess is the same (namely, `n+1) on both sides, we only need to
show that:
sk(P{MΦ0/xA}) = sk(Q{MΨ0/xB})
In order to improve the readability, we will note P ′ = P{MΦ0/xA} andQ′ = Q{MΨ0/xB}.
We have that A and B are two action-deterministic configurations such that A ≈ B.
Moreover, they perform the same trace, respectively towards An+1 and Bn+1. Thus,
thanks to Proposition 33, we deduce that enable(An+1) = enable(Bn+1). Moreover, our
hypothesis skl(P0) = skl(Q0) implies that enable(P0) = enable(Q0), and thus we de-
duce that enable(P ′) = enable(Q′) (recall that by action-determinism, unions of the form
enable(An+1) = enable(P0) ∪ enable(P ′) are actually disjoint unions). We conclude using
Proposition 34.
Case αn+1 = out(c, w) for some c and some w with w 6∈ dom(Φ(An)). This case is similar
to the previous one. However, during such a step, the frame of each configuration is enriched,
and thus the fact that Φ(An+1) ∼ Φ(Bn+1) is now a consequence of Proposition 33.
Case αn+1 = sess(a, #»c ) for some a, and some #»c . Firstly, we show for later that #»c are
fresh in Bn. Indeed, we deduce from bc(α1. . . . αn+1) ∩ fc(B) = ∅ that #»c are fresh in B and
we know that free channels of Bn are included in fc(B) ∪ bc(α1. . . . αn). Thereby, if there
was a channel ci ∈ #»c ∩ fc(Bn) it would be in bc(α1. . . . αn) but this is forbidden because of
the freshness condition (in the current trace) over channels, i.e., new channels cannot be
introduced twice (once in α1. . . . αn and once in αn+1).
As before, we obtain
An = ({[!a#»c , #  »nPP ]`n+1} unionmulti P0; Φ0) and Bn = ({[!a#»c , #  »nQQ]`n+1} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0)
for some P , Q, P0, Q0, Φ0, and Ψ0. Moreover, since skl(An) = skl(Bn), we deduce that
skl(P0) = skl(Q0).
We have
An+1 = ({[P ]`n+11, [!a#»c , #  »nPP ]`n+12} unionmulti P0; Φ0)
Accordingly, let us pose
Bn+1 = ({[Q]`n+11, [!a#»c , #  »nQQ]`n+12} unionmulti Q0; Ψ0)
We have that:
Bn
[sess(a, #»c )]`n+1−−−−−−−−−→ Bn+1; and
Φ(An+1) = Φ(An) ∼ Φ(Bn) = Φ(Bn+1).
It remains to show that skl(An+1) = skl(Bn+1). Since we have that skl(P0) = skl(Q0), and
since the labels of corresponding subprocesses are the same on both sides, we only need to
show that:
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sk(P ) = sk(Q) and
sk(!a#»c , #  »nPP ) = sk(!
a
#»c , #  »nQQ)
As in the previous case, thanks to Proposition 33, we know that enable(An+1) =
enable(Bn+1), and we deduce that enable(P ) = enable(Q) and enable(!a#»c , #  »nPP ) = enable(!
a
#»c , #  »nQQ),
which allows us to conclude using Proposition 34. J
Finally, we can define the annotated trace equivalence and show that, for action-deterministic
configurations, it coincides with trace equivalence.
I Definition 35. Let A and B be two configurations. We have that A va B if, for every A′
such that A tr−→a A′ with bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, then there exists B′ such that B tr−→a B′, and
Φ ∼ Ψ. They are in annotated trace equivalence, denoted A ≈a B, if A va B and B va A.
I Lemma 36. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations such that skl(A) =
skl(B).
A ≈ B if, and only if, A ≈a B
Proof. Firstly, A ≈a B trivially implies A ≈ B. For the other direction, we use Lemma 13 to
conclude. J
B Compression
B.1 Reachability
I Lemma (16). Let A, A′ be two configurations and tr be such that A tr−→a A′ is complete.
There exists a trace trc, such that btrcc can be obtained from tr by swapping independent
labelled actions, and dAe trc−→c dA′e.
Proof. Let A = (P; Φ) be a configuration and (P; Φ) tr−→a A′ a complete execution. We
proceed by induction on the length of tr, distinguishing two cases.
Case 1. We first consider the case where there is at least one process in P that is negative
and non-replicated. Since we are considering a complete execution, at least one negative
action α is performed on this process in tr. This action may be an output, the decomposition
of a parallel composition, or the removal of a zero. If there are more than one such action,
we choose the one that can be performed using Neg, i.e., the one that is minimal according
to our arbitrary order on labelled skeletons. Since our action can be performed initially by
our process, and by well-labelling, the label of the action is independent with all labels of
previously executed actions in tr. Moreover, there cannot be any second-order dependency
between α and one of those actions. Indeed, if α is an output, no input performed before α is
able to use the handle of α. It can thus be swapped before all the others by using Lemma 11,
obtaining an execution of trace α.tr′ ending in the same configuration A′. The rule Neg
can be performed in the compressed semantics to trigger the action α, and by induction
hypothesis on tr′ we can complete our compressed execution towards A′.
Case 2. Otherwise, when P contains only positive or replicated processes, we must choose
one process to focus on, start a positive phase and execute all its actions until we can finally
release the focus. As long as all processes are positive or replicated, only input or session
actions can be performed. In either case, the action yields a new process (the continuation
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of the input, or the new session) which may be negative or positive. We define the positive
prefix of our execution as the prefix of actions for which all but the last transition yield a
positive process. It is guaranteed to exist because A′ contains only negative processes.
The positive prefix is composed only of input and replication actions. Because session
actions are performed by negative processes, and no new negative process is created in
the positive prefix, session actions can be permuted at the beginning of the prefix thanks
to Lemma 11. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that the prefix is composed of
session actions, followed by input actions: we write tr = tr!.trin.tr0. In the portion of the
execution where inputs of trin are performed, there is an obvious bijective mapping between
the processes of any configuration and its successor, allowing us to follow execution threads,
and to freely permute inputs pertaining to different threads. Such permutations are made
possible by Lemma 11. Indeed, they concern actions that are (i) sequentially independent (i.e.,
labels are independent) since two different threads involve actions performed by processes in
parallel and (ii) recipe independent since there is no output action in trin.
The last action of the positive prefix releases a negative process P−. Let P be its antecedent
(trough its corresponding thread) in the configuration obtained after the execution of tr!. We
have that:
A = (P; Φ) tr!−→a (P1 unionmulti {P}; Φ) trin−−→a (P2 unionmulti {P−}; Φ) tr0−→a A′
Now we can write P = P0 unionmulti {Pf} where Pf is either P or a replicated process that gives rise
to P in one transition. By permuting actions pertaining to Pf before all others thanks to
Lemma 11 and previous remarks, we obtain an execution of the form
A = (P0 unionmulti {Pf}; Φ) tr1−→a (P ′0 unionmulti {P−}; Φ) tr2−→a (P2 unionmulti {P−}; Φ) tr0−→a A′
where tr1.tr2.tr0 is a permutation of tr of independent labelled actions, tr1 = [α]`.tr′1, and
P ′0 = P0 when Pf = P , and P ′0 = P0 unionmulti {Pf} otherwise.
In the compressed semantics, if we initiate a focus on Pf we can execute the actions of tr1
and release the focus when reaching P−, i.e., we have that (where `′ is the label of P−):
(P;∅; Φ) [foc(α)]`−−−−−→c tr′1−→c (P ′0;P−; Φ) [rel]
`′−−−→c (P ′0 unionmulti {P−};∅; Φ).
We can conclude by induction hypothesis on tr2.tr0. J
B.2 Equivalence
We prove below the two implications of Theorem 18, dealing first with soundness and then
with the more involved completeness result.
I Lemma 37 (Soundness). Let A and B be action-deterministic configurations such that
skl(A) = skl(B). We have that A ≈ B implies dAe ≈c dBe.
Proof. By symmetry it suffices to show dAe vc dBe. Consider an execution dAe tr−→c A′
such that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. Thanks to Lemma 15, we know that A btrc−−→a bA′c. Let
btrc = [α1]`1 . . . [αn]`n , and we denote A1, . . . , An the intermediate configurations that are
reached during this execution. We have that:
A0 = A [α1]
`1−−−→a A1 [α2]`2−−−→a . . . [αn]`n−−−→a An = (P; ΦA).
Applying Lemma 13, we deduce that B can perform a very similar execution (same labels,
same actions), i.e.,
B0 = B [α1]
`1−−−→a B1 [α2]`2−−−→a . . . [αn]`n−−−→a Bn = (Q; ΦB).
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with Φ(Ai) ∼ Φ(Bi) and skl(Ai) = skl(Bi) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Due to this strong symmetry, we are sure that dBe will be able to do this execution in
the compressed semantics. In particular, the fact that a given configuration Bi can start
a positive phase or has to release the focus is determined by the set skl(Bi) = skl(Ai) and
the fact that it can keep the focus on a specific process while performing positive actions
can be deduce from labels of tr. Finally, we have shown that if Ai can execute an action
α using Neg rule then Bi can as well. The only missing part is about the fact that Neg
has been made non-branching using an arbitrary order on labelled skeletons. Let say we
can use Neg only for actions whose skeleton is minimal among others skeletons of available,
negative actions. Using skl(Ai) = skl(Bi), we easily show that this is symmetric for Ai
and Bi. This way, we obtain an execution dBe tr−→c B′ with bB′c = Bn. Finally, we have
Φ(B′) = ΦB ∼ ΦA = Φ(A′). J
I Lemma 38. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations such that A ≈c B. If
A tr−→c A′ and B tr−→c B′ for a labelled trace tr then A′ ≈c B′.
Proof. We assume A ≈c B, A tr−→c A′ and B tr−→c B′ for a labelled trace tr = α1. . . . αn.
We shall prove A′ ≈c B′. By symmetry, we show one inclusion. Consider an execution
A′ tr2−→c A2 such that bc(tr2) ∩ fc(B′) = ∅. Let us construct an execution B′ tr2−→c B2 such
that Φ(A2) ∼ Φ(B2). Firstly, remark that since B tr−→c B′, we have that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅.
In order to exploit our hypothesis A ≈c B, we shall prove that bc(tr.tr2)∩ fc(B) = ∅. All that
remains to show is bc(tr2) ∩ (fc(B)\fc(B′)) = ∅. This is implied by the fact that channels in
fc(B)\fc(B′) must occur in tr as bound channels and, because of the execution A tr.tr2−−−→c A2,
those channels cannot appear in the set bc(tr2).
We have that A tr.tr2−−−→c A2 and thus by hypothesis, B tr.tr2−−−→c B2 with Φ(B2) ∼ Φ(A2).
Since there can be at most one process in B that has a label that matches the label of α1,
there is at most one configuration B1 that satisfies B α1−→c B1. By iteration, we obtain the
unicity of the configuration B′ satisfying B tr−→c B′. We thus have obtained the required
execution B′ tr2−→c B2. J
I Lemma 39. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations. If for any complete
execution A tr−→a A′ with bc(tr)∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists a trace tr′ and an execution B tr′−→a B′
such that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′), then A va B.
Proof. Let A tr0−→a A0 be an execution of A with bc(tr0)∩ fc(B) = ∅. Firstly, we complete the
latter execution in an arbitrary way A tr0.tr1−−−→a A′ such that any process of A′ is replicated
and bc(tr0.tr1)∩ fc(B) = ∅ (it suffices to choose fresh channels for B as well). By hypothesis,
there exists an execution B tr0.tr1−−−→a B′ such that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). The latter execution of B
is thus of the form B tr0−→a B0 tr1−→a B′. It remains to show that Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0). For the
sake of contradiction, we assume that Φ(B0) ∼ Φ(A0) does not hold. In other words, there
is a test of equality over dom(Φ(B0)) that holds for Φ(A0) and does not for Φ(B0) (or the
converse). Since dom(Φ(B0)) ⊆ dom(Φ(B′)) = dom(Φ(A′)), this same test can be used to
conclude that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′) does not hold as well leading to an absurd conclusion. J
I Lemma 40 (Completeness). Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations
satisfying skl(A) = skl(B). Then dAe ≈c dBe implies A ≈ B.
Proof. Assume bAc ≈c bBc, thanks to Lemma 36, it suffices to show A ≈a B. Let us
show the following intermediate result: for any complete execution A tr−→a A′ such that
bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there is an execution B tr−→a B′ such that Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). Thanks to
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Lemma 39 and by symmetry of ≈a, this intermediate result implies the required conclusion
A ≈a B.
Let A tr−→a A′ be a complete execution with bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. We thus have that A′ is
initial. Applying the Lemma 16, we obtain a trace trc such that dAe trc−→c dA′e and btrcc can
be obtained from tr by swapping independent actions. Since we have dAe ≈c dBe, we deduce
that dBe trc−→c dB′e with Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). Lemma 15 gives us B btrcc−−→a B′. We can now apply
Lemma 11 to obtain B tr−→a B′ and conclude. J
C Reduction
C.1 Reachability
I Lemma (21). Let A and A′ be two initial configurations such that A tr−→c A′. We have that
A tr
′−→c A′ for any tr′ ≡Φ(A′) tr.
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 15, we have that bAc btrc−−→a (P; Φ). We first prove that tr′ can
be performed using −→a. For this, it suffices to establish the implication for each of the
two generators of ≡Φ. The first case is given by Lemma 11. The second one is a common
property of (derivatives of) the applied pi-calculus that follows from a simple observation
of the transition rules. Finally, we must prove that tr′ can be played using −→c. Thanks to
initiality of A and (P;∅; Φ) we know that each block of tr starts when the configuration
is initial and after performing it we get another initial configuration. This is still true in
bAc btr′c−−→a (P; Φ). Finally, labels of blocks of tr′ ensures that a single process is used in a
positive part of any block. Having proving those two facts, we can easily show that each
block of tr′ can be performed using −→c. J
For the sake of readability of the following proofs, we now introduce some notations
(where b1, b2 are two blocks and Φ is a frame):
we note b1 ‖s b2 when b1 and b2 are sequentially independent (i.e., for any α1 ∈ b1 and
α2 ∈ b2, α1 and α2 are sequentially independent);
we note b1 ‖d b2 when b1 and b2 are recipe independent (i.e., for any α1 ∈ b1 and α2 ∈ b2,
α1 and α2 are recipe independent);
for two traces tr = b1 . . . bn and tr′ = b′1 . . . b′m, we note (tr =E tr′)Φ when n = m and for
all i ∈ [1;n], (bi =E b′i)Φ.
I Remark. Let A tr−→c A′ be any compressed execution. If b1 and b2 are two blocks of tr and
a1 (resp. a2) is the first labelled action of b1 (resp. b2) we have the following:
b1 ‖s b2 ⇐⇒ a1 is sequentially independent with a2.
This is implied by the fact that for any other action a′1 of b1, its label has the label of a1 as
a prefix.
I Lemma (24). Let A be an initial configuration and A′ = (P ;∅; Φ) be a configuration such
that A tr−→c A′. We have that tr is Φ-minimal if, and only if, A tr−→r A′.
Proof. Let A and (P;∅; Φ) be two configurations such that A tr−→c (P;∅; Φ).
(⇒) We first show that if tr is Φ-minimal, then A tr−→r (P;∅; Φ) by induction on the
trace tr. The base case, i.e., tr =  is straightforward. Now, assume that tr = tr0.b for
some block b and A tr0−→c (P0;∅; Φ0) b−→c A′. Since tr is Φ-minimal, we also have that tr0
is Φ0-minimal and thus we obtain by induction hypothesis that A tr0−→r (P0;∅; Φ0). To
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conclude, it remains to show that tr0 . b′ for any b′ such that (b′ =E b)Φ0. Assume that it is
not the case, this means that for some b′ such that (b =E b′)Φ0, the trace tr0 can be written
tr′0.b0. . . . .bn with:
bi ‖ b′ and bi ≺ b′ for any i > 0, as well as b0 ‖ b′ and b′ ≺ b0.
Let tr′ = tr′0.b′.b0 . . . bn. We have tr′ ≺lex tr and tr′ ≡Φ tr0.b′, which contradicts the Φ-
minimality of tr.
(⇐) Now, we assume that tr is not Φ-minimal, and we want to establish that tr cannot be
executed in the reduced semantics. Let trm be the Φ-minimal trace of the equivalence class
of tr. We have in particular trm ≡Φ tr and trm ≺lex tr. Now, we let trsm (resp. trs) be the
“trace of labelled skeletons” associated to trm (resp. tr). Let trs0 be the longest common prefix
of trsm and trs and tr0 (resp. tr′0) be the corresponding prefix of tr (resp. trm). We have a
decomposition of the form tr = tr0.b.tr1 and trm = tr′0.bm.tr′1 with (tr0 =E tr′0)Φ and bm ≺ b.
Again, since when dropping recipes, the relation ≡Φ only swaps sequentially independent
labelled skeletons, block bm must have a counterpart in tr and, more precisely, in tr1. We
thus have a more precise decomposition of tr: tr = tr0.b.tr11.b′m.tr12 such that (b′m =E bm)Φ.
We now show that b′m cannot be executed after tr0.b.tr11 in the reduced semantics
(assuming that the trace has been executed so far in the reduced semantics). In other words,
we show that tr0.b.tr11 . b′m does not hold. We have seen that (b′m =E bm)Φ and bm ≺ b so it
suffices to show:
bm ‖ bi for any bi ∈ b.tr11
First, we prove bi ‖d bm (i.e., they are recipe independent) for any bi ∈ b.tr11. This
comes from the fact that tr′0.bm.tr′1 = trm is plausible, and thus the inputs of bm only use
handles introduced in tr′0 which are the same as those introduced in tr0. In particular, the
inputs of bm do not rely on the handles introduced in b.tr11. Similarly, using the fact that
tr0.b.tr11.b′m.tr12 = tr is plausible and b′−m = b−m, we deduce that handles of outputs of bm are
not used in b.tr11.
Second, we show that bi ‖s bm (i.e., they are sequentially independent) for any bi ∈ b.tr11.
For this, we remark that for any traces tr1.b.tr2 ≡Φ tr′1.b′.tr′2 such that (b =E b′)Φ, we have that
b ‖s bs for all bs ∈ skl(tr′1)\skl(tr1) where skl(tr) is the multiset of labelled skeletons of blocks
of tr, and \ should be read as multiset subtraction. This can be easily shown by induction
on the relation ≡Φ. By applying this helping remark to tr0.b′m.tr′2 ≡Φ tr0.b.tr11.b′m.tr12, we
obtain the required conclusion: b′m ‖
s
b.tr11 and thus bm ‖s b.tr11. J
C.2 Equivalence
I Proposition 41. For any static equivalent frames Φ ∼ Ψ and compressed traces tr and tr′,
we have that tr ≡Φ tr′ if, and only if, tr ≡Ψ tr′.
Proof. The two implications are symmetric, we thus only show one implication. Considering
the two generators of ≡Φ, the only non-trivial step is to show that tr.b1.tr′ ≡Ψ tr.b2.tr′ when
(b1 =E b2)Φ. But the latter condition, together with Φ ∼ Ψ, yields (b1 =E b2)Ψ which allows
us to conclude. J
I Lemma 42. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations. If for any complete
execution of the form A tr−→c (P;∅; Φ) with bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists an execution
B tr−→c (Q;∅; Ψ) such that Φ ∼ Ψ, then A vc B.
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Proof. Let A and B be two action-deterministic configurations, and assume that for any
complete execution A tr−→c (P;∅; Φ) with bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists an execution
B tr−→c (Q;∅; Ψ) such that Φ ∼ Ψ. Now, we have to establish that A vc B.
Let (P ′;∅; Φ′) be a configuration such that A tr′−→c (P ′;∅; Φ′). First, we can complete
this execution to reach a process (P;∅; Φ) such that each process P ∈ P is replicated, i.e.,
A tr
′−→c (P ′;∅; Φ′) tr+−−→c (P;∅; Φ) is a complete execution.
Without loss of generality, we can choose tr+ so that it satisfies bc(tr+) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. By
hypothesis, we know that there exists an execution B tr′tr+−−−→c (Q;∅; Ψ) such that Φ ∼ Ψ. Let
B′ be the configuration reached along this execution after the execution of tr′ and Ψ′ its
frame. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 39, we prove that Φ ∼ Ψ implies Φ′ ∼ Ψ′. J
I Theorem (26). Let A and B be two initial, action-deterministic configurations.
A ≈c B if, and only if, A ≈r B
Proof. We prove the two directions separately.
(⇒) A vc B implies A vr B. Consider an execution of the form A tr−→r (P;∅; Φ) with
bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. Using Lemma 23, we know that A tr−→c (P;∅; Φ), and Lemma 24 tells us
that tr is Φ-minimal. Since A vc B, we deduce that there exists (Q;∅; Ψ) such that:
B tr−→c (Q;∅; Ψ) and Φ ∼ Ψ.
Now, by Proposition 41 we obtain that tr is also Ψ-minimal, and so Lemma 24 tells us that
the execution of tr by B can also be performed in the reduced semantics.
(⇐) A vr B implies A vc B. Relying on Lemma 42, it is actually sufficient to show that
for any complete execution A tr−→c (P;∅; Φ) = A′ with bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅, there exists an
execution of the form B tr−→c (Q;∅; Ψ) such that Φ ∼ Ψ. Note that since the given execution
is complete, we have that A′ is initial. Let tr′ be a Φ-minimal trace in the equivalence class
of tr. We have that A executes tr′ in the reduced semantics, and so for some B′ we have
B tr
′−→r B′ and Φ(B′) ∼ Φ.
Using Lemma 23, we obtain the same execution in the compressed semantics. Finally, by
Proposition 41 we obtain tr′ ≡Φ(B′) tr, and by Lemma 21 we obtain:
B tr−→c B′ and Φ(B′) ∼ Φ
J
D Optimization for improper blocks
Between any two initial configurations, the compressed as well as the reduced semantics
execute a sequence of actions of the form of the form foc(α).tr+.rel.tr− where tr+ is a
(possibly empty) sequence of input actions, whereas tr− is a (non-empty) sequence of out,
par, and zero actions. Such sequences are called blocks. Now, we also make a distinction
between blocks having a null negative phase (i.e., tr− = zero), and the others. The former
are called improper blocks whereas the latter are called proper blocks. Finally, we say that a
trace is proper if it contains at most one improper block and only at the end of the trace.
The idea is that, when checking trace equivalence, we do not have to consider all possible
traces but we can actually restrict to proper ones. We present below an improved version of
the notions of compressed and reduced equivalence.
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D.1 Compression
I Definition 43. Let A and B be two configurations. We have that A vc+i B if, for every
A′ such that A tr−→c A′ and bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅ for some proper tr, there exists B′ such that
B tr−→c B′ with Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). We write A ≈c+i B, if A vc+i B and B vc+i A.
Operationally, we can obtain ≈c+i by adding a case to the Release rule (and constraining
the former rule to not apply in that case):
Releasei (P; [0]`; Φ) [rel]
`
−−−−→c (∅;∅; Φ)
This rule discards exactly the traces containing an improper block that is not at the end:
note that having 0 under focus implies that the negative part of the block will be restricted
to zero. This is because no negative actions was available before performing this block and
consequently there can only be a zero in the negative part of the block.
I Proposition 44. Let A and B be two initial action-deterministic configurations.
A ≈c B if, and only, if, A ≈c+i B
Proof. The (⇒) direction is trivial. We focus on the other one. Assume that A vc+i B. Let
A′ be such that A tr−→c A′ for some tr such that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. Let b1, . . . , bk be the
improper blocks that occur in tr. We have that b1, . . . , bk are pairwise independent. Moreover,
we have that there exists tr′ made of proper blocks such that tr′.b1. . . . .bk is obtained from tr
by swapping independent blocks, and thus we have that A tr′.b1. . . . .bk−−−−−−→c A′. There exist initial
configurations A0, A1, . . . , Ak such that A tr
′−→c A0, and
A0
b1−→c A1, A0 b2−→c A2, . . . , A0 bk−→c Ak.
Thanks to our hypothesis, we deduce that there exist configurations B0, B1, . . . , Bk such
that B tr′−→c B0 with Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0), and
B0
b1−→c B1, B0 b2−→c B2, . . . , B0 bk−→c Bk.
We have also that Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0). Since blocks b1, . . . , bk are pairwise independent, we
deduce that there exist B′ such that B tr′−→c B0 b1, . . . , bk−−−−−→c B′ with Φ(B′) = Φ(B0). Then,
permutations of blocks can be undone to retrieve tr (since swapping have been done between
independent blocks). J
D.2 Reduction
I Definition 45. Let A and B be two configurations. We have that A vr+i B if, for every
A′ such that A tr−→r A′ and bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅ for some proper tr, there exists B′ such that
B tr−→r B′ with Φ(A′) ∼ Φ(B′). We write A ≈r+i B, if A vr+i B and B vr+i A.
I Proposition 46. Let A and B be two initial action-deterministic configurations.
A ≈r B if, and only, if, A ≈r+i B
Proof. The (⇒) direction is trivial. We focus on the other one. Assume that A vr+i B. Let
A′ be such that A tr−→r A′ for some tr such that bc(tr) ∩ fc(B) = ∅. Lemma 23 tells us that
A tr−→c A′, and thanks to Lemma 24, we have that tr is Φ(A′)-minimal.
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Let b1, . . . , bk be the improper blocks that occur in tr. We have that there exist
tr0, tr1, . . . , trk made of proper blocks such that tr = tr0.b1.tr1.b2. . . . trk−1.bk.trk. We have
that b1, . . . , bk are pairwise independent, and also:
tr ≡Φ(A′) tr0.tr1 . . . trk.b1. . . . .bk
Because there are no dependencies between bi and trj for i < j, and because the bi do
not have any output, we have that A tr0.tr1. . . . .trk−−−−−−−→r A0, and also that:
A tr0.b1−−−→r A1, A tr0.tr1.b2−−−−−→r A2, . . ., A tr0.tr1. . . . .trk−1.bk−−−−−−−−−−→r Ak.
Thanks to our hypothesis, we deduce that there exist B0, B1, . . . , Bk such that B tr0.tr1. . . . .trk−−−−−−−→r
B0 with Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0), and also that:
B tr0.b1−−−→r B1, B tr0.tr1.b2−−−−−→r B2, . . ., B tr0.tr1. . . . .trk−1.bk−−−−−−−−−−→r Bk.
We deduce that there exists B′ such that B tr0.tr1 . . . .trk.b1. . . . .bk−−−−−−−−−−−−→c B′. Next, we observe that
Φ(A′) = Φ(A0) ∼ Φ(B0) = Φ(B′). From this we conclude tr ≡Φ(B′) tr0.tr1 . . . trk.b1. . . . .bk,
hence B tr−→c B′. Since tr is Φ(A′)-minimal it is also Φ(B′)-minimal, and thus B tr−→r B′ by
Lemma 24. J
© David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, and Lucca Hirschi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
